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I. INTRODUCTION
Water, water, everywhere, nor any drop to drink.' In terms of the water
bodies and wetlands that the Clean Water Acte ("CWA") protects, this could be
an accurate statement for those who are not familiar with it.Some people might
think that the CWA applies to all bodies of water within the United States. That
impression would not be that far off from the truth in the sense of delineating
which navigable water bodies the CWA regulates, which the CWA defines as
"the waters of the United States. " '
In reality, the CWA's definition of "the waters of the United States," as
defined by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps of Engineers"), and the courts, do not in fact cover
all water bodies within the borders of the United States.! If this situation was
not confusing enough, the many changes to the definition of the waters of the
United States adopted by EPA and the Corps of Engineers over the life of the
CWA add further complexity to the problem of ascertaining the precise jurisdiction of the CWA.' The fractured Supreme Court case addressing this issue,
Japanos v. UnitedStates, further adds to the complexity. Rapanos had no majority opinion, only a plurality decision,' and courts have disagreed over which
opinion or opinions control.' The CWA's imprecise definition of "waters of
the United States" plus the Supreme Court's failed attempt to define this term
in Rapanos has created a lot of uncertainty and unpredictability as to which
water bodies the CWA protects.' Because lower federal courts have disagreed
on how to interpret the Japanosholding or holdings, it is not likely the confusion will end soon. Moreover, the Supreme Court has declined to clarify the
issue by granting certiorari even though lower courts are split on this issue.'" In
the wake of the Rapanosdecision, lower courts must grapple with what opinion
or opinions control and how to apply that opinion within the totality of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the CWA."
This Article first analyzes how lower courts should interpret "waters of the
United States" under the CWA and how the holdings of Japanos should be
understood." Based on that analysis, this Article determines that there is a
1. SAMUELT. COLYRIDGE, THE RIME OFTHE ANCIENT MARINER, rcpriiitedin COLERIDGE
AND TEXTUAL INSTABIIJTY: THE MUI:rIPLE VERSIONS OF THE MAJOR POEMS 160 Uack
Stillinger ed., 1994).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2014).
3. § 1362(7).
4. Sce33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a),(h) (2014).
5. See infra Part II.C-K.
6. See 547 U.S. 715 (2006)
7. See id.; See infra Part 11.I.
8. Darnien M. Schiff, Post-RapanosFallout, 41 No. 2 ABATRENDS 12, 12-13 (2009).
9. See id., infra Part III.
10. Schiff, supra note 8 at 13.
I]. See infha Part IIl.
12. See inti.a Part III.
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method which can bring consistency and predictability to the determination of
which waters and wetlands are waters of the United States the CWA protects.'3
Specifically, this Article emphasizes which wetlands the CWA should protect
as wetlands adjacent to a CWA-protected water body. The method promoted
by this Article for determining what wetlands the CWA protects as adjacent
wetlands is a wetland functions approach." The first step in this process is to
determine what function the wetland most evidently demonstrates.'" This Article then advocates the application of a corresponding test from one of the opinions in Rapanos to determine if the wetland is an adjacent wetland protected by
the CWA.'"
To better understand how a wetland functions approach is applicable in
determining how to apply the opinions in Rapanos it is necessary to understand
what the purpose of the CWA is," how wetlands fall within the CWA," and
what the definition of protected waters was prior to tie enactment of tie CWA.9
Furthermore, it is critical to understand the CWA's initial scope once the CWA
took elfect,' ° and the present interpretation of which waters fall under the
CWA's authority." Subsequently, United States v. lRiveiside 13aJ4ew Homes
Inc., the promulgation of the migratory bird rule,' and the Solid W le Agency
of Noithern Cook County v. US. Army Corps of Lng'rs (SWANCC) affected
the interpretation of the CWA's authority.' Invalidation of the migratory bird
rule in SWANCCled to a broadening of the CWA's aithority.'
To appreciate the simplicity and certainty a wetland functions approach
brings to Rapanos, one must examnine the Rapanos plurality and concuring
opinions to see how the opinions are incongruous. " Moreover, this examination demonstrates how the lack of certainty provided in these opinions affected
the CWA stakeholders, and prompted the EPA and the Corps of Engineers to
draft guidances in 2008 and 2011 to interpret the opinions.7 These guidances
ultimately led to the EPA's and Corps' final rule aimed at more precisely delineating what waters fall under the CWA."
This Article's discussion of court decisions, guidances, and attempts at rule

13.
14.

See inlra Part IV.
See irlia Part IV.A.

15.
16.

See infla PartIV.A.
,Sec infraPartIV.

17.

See infra Part II.A.

18.

See intra Part II.C.

19.

See infia Part II.A-C.

20.
21.

See inlfa Part II.D.
Sec infra Part II.E.

22.

474 U.S. 121 (1985); sec nlia Part II.F.

23. ,Seeintia Part II.G.
24. Sec inhia Part II.G.
25.

See inliaPart II.H.

26. See inl/a Part 11.1.
27. See in/iaPart II J.
28. See in/ia Part 1.K.
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making show how flummoxed and uncertain the courts have been after the Rapanos decision.' And this lack of direction has also resulted in courts inconsistently applying the Marks' doctrine to Rapnos' Therefore, courts need a
consistent and predictable approach, like the one advocated in this Article,
which produces foreseeable results. 3" But, to demonstrate this approach's viability, one must understand more than the approach's framework. Consequently, this Article discusses and analyzes each wetland function (including
groundwater recharge, flood and erosion protection, pollution reduction, wildlife habitat, and economic importance), links each function to the appropriate
opinion in Rapanos, and then discusses lower court decisions issued after Rapanos that have implicitly followed this Article's thesis by focusing upon a wetland's functions in applying Rapanos.' Additionally, this Article includes discussion of the types of evidence that can demonstrate that a wetland function is
present in the wetland at issue."4 Finally, this Article explains why the wetland
functions approach advocated by this Article is consistent with the EPA's and
Corps' final rule.'
11. THE RiVERS AND PONDS TO RAPANOS AND BEYOND
A. THE CLFAN WATER ACT

In 1948, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("ICWPCA"), the act that later became the modern CWA. ' The FWPCA was
largely ineffectual at preventing or controlling water pollution because the states
possessed primary responsibility under the FWPCA for dealing with water pollution, and the states displayed an inability to control pollution for many years.
The government's role under the 1948 FWPCA was only to strengthen state
efforts by providing technical advice and additional funding.' The FWPCA
and its subsequent amendments, prior to 1972, achieved limited results in improving water quality in the United States.' In response to the 1948 FWPCA
ineffectiveness, Congress enacted amendments to the legislation in 1972, which
became known as the CWA. ' The CWA's purpose is to restore and maintain

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See inlf Part II.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
See infra Part III.B.
See in/i-a Part [V.A.
See infra Parts IV.B-F.

34. See infra Part IV.G.
35. See infra Part IV.H.
36. See William L. Andreen, 7he Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States-Sate, Local, andFederalF/Tons, 1789-1972 Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. Lj. 215, 235-86

(2003) (discussing evolution of FWPCA into the modern CWA).
37. ld.
at 236-37.
38. Id. at 237.
39. Kenneth M. Murchison, LearningFrom More Than Phve-and-a-HalfDeeades of Federal
Water 1 ollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENvTnL. AFF. L.

REv. 527, 534 (2005).
40. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); id. at 536 n. 71
(stating that the name, "Clean Water Act" was not adopted until the amendments to the FIWPCA
of 1997).
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the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters" to achieve
the goal of eliminating discharges of pollutants by 1985.
B. How THE CWA REGULATES POLLUI'ANT DISCHARGES
The CWA attempts to eliminate discharges into the nation's waters in several ways.' One way is by outlawing "discharges" of pollutants into water without a permit." The CWA states that"... the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful,"" and defines discharge as either a discharge of a pollutant or pollutants.' Furthermore, the CWA defines a discharge of a pollutant
or pollutants as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source" or, "any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone
or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.""
The CWA goes on to define navigable waters as, "the waters of the United
States including the territorial seas."" The CWA defines "pollutant" to include
dirt, rock, and sand in addition to more intuitive items like sewage, chemical
waste, and garbage." One type of permnit that avoids violation of CWA Section
301 (a) is a Section 404 permit.' This permit allows a permit holder to discharge, at a point source dredged or fill material (dirt, rock, and sand) into navigable waters.' Thus, the CWA requires a Section 404 pernit for the discharge
of dredged or fill material into a wetland if the wetland is considered "navigable
waters" under the CWA'
C. How NAVIGABLE WATERS WERE DEFINED BEFORE THE FWPCA AN)
CWA

Prior to adoption of the FWPCA and the CWA, the definition of navigable
waters derived from the common law rule of waterway navigability stemming
from Congress' authority to regulate waterways for the purpose of protecting or
advancing commerce under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution" Under the English common law rule, to deem.a waterway as navigable,
it had to be influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide.' In The Daniel Ball
case, the Supreme Court held that "navigable waters of the United States," subject to regulation by Congress under its commerce clause powers, are interstate
waters that are navigable in-fact.55 The Court further defined navigable in-fact
41. 61C AM.JUR. 21)Pollution Control§ 675 (2014) (citing Black Warn'or Riverkeeper Inc
v. Chcrokee Mining LL C, 548 F.3d 986 ( 1th Cir. 2008).
42. Murchison, supra note 39, at 537.
43. See id. at 537-38.
44. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2015).

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(16).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557,563-64 (1870).
Id.at 563.

55.

Id
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waters as those waters that in their ordinary condition are used or are susceptible
to being used as highways of conmerce.' The Court explained that waters
could form the conditions that allowed them to be used as highways of commerce on their own or in uniting with other waterways. 7 Therefore, navigable
waters subject to regulation by Congress under its commerce clause powers, at
this time in history, were those that were navigable in-fact, or more specifically,
those that supported or could support interstate water-borne commerce.'
D. THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' INITIAL INTIERPRITATION OF WATERS OF
THE U.S. PROTECTED UNDER THE 1972 CWA
Initially the Corps of Engineers interpreted the CWA to cover only navigable in-fact waters, but in 1974 it issued regulations providing that its CWA definition of "waters of the United Slates" included navigable waters, interstate waters, non-navigable intrastate waters that could affect interstate commerce, and
the tributaries of these waters, but the definition did not include wetlands."
However, environmental interest groups believed that the CWA needed to regulate wetlands for the CWA to achieve its goal to restore and maintain the nation's waters.' These environmentalists, in 1975, challenged the Corps of Engineers' interpretation of the scope of the CWA in NaturalResources Deknse
Council Inc. v. Cal/away,arguing that the waters of the United States included
wetlands regardless of if they were truly navigable.' The court held that the
CWA's jurisdiction reached to the maximum extent permissible under the
commerce clause and that the CWA's definition of navigable waters "... is not
limited to the traditional tests of navigability."" The Corps of Engineers acquiesced to this interpretation when it declined to appeal that decision to the Court
of Appeals.' With this expansive new grant of authority, the EPA and the Corps
of Engineers promulgated federal regulations defining the waters of the United
States to include all interstate wetlands"4 and wetlands adjacent to interstate waters, their tributaries, or waters that could be used or affect interstate cornmerce.' This expanded the EPA's and the Corps of Engineers' authority over
wetlands throughout the United States.'
E. THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' AND EPA'S PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF
CWA NAVIGABLE WATERS

Presently, the Corps of Engineers and the EPA define navigable waters as
56. Id.
57. Id. at 560, 563.
58. See Timothy J. Zeilman, Connecticut by Canoe: Navtiabikhy in the Nutmeg State, 84
CONN. Bj. 305, 316-17 (2010).
59. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1985);Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Rewqiling "Waters ofthe UnitedStates"andthe Linits
of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 Mo. ENvmL L. & Poi.'Y REv. 1, 3 (2006).
60. Adler, supra note 59, at 3.
61. Id. (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975)).
62. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686.
63. Adler, supra note 59, at 3.
64. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2) (2015).
65. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3-5), (7).
66. Adler, supra note 59, at 4.
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waters of the United States,6 which are more particularly defined in the Code
of Federal Regulations.' The Corps of Engineers and EPA define the waters
of the United States under the CWA to include waters that are navigable-in-fact
or subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, interstate waters or wetlands, all other
waters, such as intrastate waters, which could affect interstate or foreign commerce, and impoundments of these waters.'9 Additionally, the two agencies define waters of the United States to include all tributaries of the aforementioned
waters, territorial seas, and any wetlands adjacent to the previously identified
waters." Under this definition the EPA and other regulatory agencies apply the
CWA to many waters whose navigability-in-fact is questionable, or which are
not navigable in-fact.' Specifically, the Corps of Engineers and the EPA extended the CWA to areas they believed the CWA needed protection to accomplish its stated goal of restoring the integrity of the nation's waters."
Under the EPA's and the Corps of Engineers' present regulations, navigable waters include waters that affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce based on their navigability, or their connection to activities that affect
interstate or foreign commerce. These regulations also define CWA navigable
waters to include impoundments of waters, tributaries of waters that affect or
could affect interstate or foreign commerce, and wetlands adjacent to these waters.'
The regulations further define "wetlands" as "those areas that are inundated
or saturated by surlace or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."' The regulations define the term "adjacent" in adjacent wetlands as: "... bordering, contiguous, or neighboring."
Therefore, wetlands fall under the purview of the
CWA if they border a navigable water body or waterway."
F. UNITED STATES V. RIVERSIDE BAYVIEW HOMES INC.
After the United States District Court for the District of Columnbia issued
an opinion expansively defining the scope of the waters of the United States in

67. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2015).
68. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2015).
69. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1-4) (describing waters that could affect interstate or foreign commerce as those that could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreation or where fish
and shellfish could be taken firom and sold in interstate or foreign conmucrce, or the waters could
be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICI'ONARY 625 (11 th ed. 2003) (defining an impoundment as a collection or confinement of water like in a reservoir).
70. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5-7); 33 U.S.C § 1362(8) (defining territorial seas as the belt of the
seas along the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and extending seaward a distance

of three miles).
71. Adler, supra note 59, at 4-8.
72. Adler, supranote 59, at 3.
73. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1-3).
74. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4-7).
75. Id.at § 328.3(c)(4).
76. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1) (providing that wetlands separated from waters by man-made
dikes or barriers, natural river belmS, beach dunes, and the like, are adjacent wetlands).

77. See33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2015); see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7), (c)(1).
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78
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what wetlands, if any, are
Callaway,
protected under the CWA, in United Slates v. Riverside Bayvew Homes Inc."
In this case, a development company wished to turn eighty acres of undeveloped land into a housing development. " However, the Corps of Engineers
deemed a portion of this land as adjacent wetlands protected under the CWA,
and the housing development company was not allowed to fill in this portion to
make it suitable for development without obtaining a Section 404 permit as required under the CWA. ' Nevertheless, the developer began filling the wetland,
which caused the Corps of Engineers to respond with legal action." In the ensuing case the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the proximity that
wetlands must have to navigable waters to be considered waters of the United
States.' Under the second step of Chevron deference," the Court found that
because wetlands affect the water quality of adjacent water bodies (lakes, rivers,
and streams), these water bodies do not submerge the wetlands, and because
there is difficulty in determining where land ends and water bodies begin," the
Corps of Engineers reasonably concluded that wetlands adjacent to waters of
the United States are within CWA jurisdiction.-

G. MIGRATORY BIRD RULE

After Riverside Bayt4ew concluded in 1985, the Corps of Engineers made
further efforts to bring wetlands underneath the CWA umbrella as waters of the
United States. "7 These efforts resulted in the promulgation of the "Migratory
Bird Rule."' This rule provided that water bodies that could affect interstate or
foreign commerce when used, degraded, or destroyed, which Corps of Engineers' regulations include within its definition of CWA "waters of the United

78.
79.

Natural Res. Def. Council Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,123-24, 126 (1985).

80. J. Kenneth Adams, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, hIc.: Wetlands, ,sh or
Waterfowl?, 32 LoY. L. REv. 477, 477 (1986).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131-32.
84. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Del. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-43 (1984) (creating the Chevron Doctrine, which requires a court, when reviewing a federal administrative
agency's construction of a statute, to follow a two-step process. First, the court must determine
whether Congress has directly spoken on the question at hand. If Congress has done so, or if
legislative intent is clear, then'the court must follow the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the question at
issue, then the court moves on to step two. In step two, the court must detennine if the agency
has interpreted the ambiguity or silence in the statute at issue based on a permissible, reasonable
construction. If the agency has followed a reasonable and permissible construction, then the

court accepts the agency's interpretation, ending the controversy.).
85.

Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131, 134.

86. Id. at 139.
87. Edward Alburo Morrissey, TheJurisdietionofthe Clean Water Act Over Isolated Wetlands: 7he MigratoryBirdRule, 22J. LF Is. 137,137 (1996) (explaining the expanded definition
of "waters of the United States" found in the Corps of Engineers' preamble to the federal regula-

tions in 1986).
88. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 320).

Issue I

A WETLAI)

APPROA CH TO RAPANOS

States," also encompassed those waters that are used or could be used by migratory birds that cross state lines, endangered species that use the waters as
habitat, and birds that are protected by Migratory Bird treaties.' The Corps of
Engineers claimed that the Migratory Bird Rule was a necessary addition in response to the requests for clarification stemming from the court's ruling in Riverside 13aywiew.' Yet in actuality, this rule allowed the Corps of Engineers, under CWA authority, to exercise jurisdiction over isolated intrastate wetlands.'
After Riverside Bayview5 expansive interpretation of "waters of the United
States," the Supreme Court considered whether the Migratory Bird Rule lawfully included isolated seasonal and permanent ponds as part of that delinition
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC') 2
In
SWANCCthe Corps of Engineers tried to prevent a consortium of municipalities from converting an abandoned mine, which contained seasonal and permanent ponds, into a landfill because the site served as habitat for migratory
birds that cross state lines." The SWANCC Court distinguished Riverside
13ayview by stating that a sigificant nexus existed between the wedands and
navigable waters in question there, but the waters in SWANCC lacked such a
nexus." Specifically, the Court in SWANCCheld that for a wetland to be protected under the CWA as a wetland adjacent to waters of the Junited States, a
nexus must exist between the wetland and the navigable waters." The Court
thereby distinguished SWANCCfrom Riverside Bayview on the grounds that
Congress' concern for water quality protection indicated its intent to regulate
wetlands inseparably bound--due to the existence of a nexus - with waters of
the United States. ' The Court held that such a nexus was lacking in the
SWANCC case, thus it held that Congress' intent was not to authorize the
Corps of Engineers to extend the CWA'sjurisdiction, under the Migratory Bird
Rule, to ponds not adjacent to open water." The Court did not believe that the
regulation of isolated ponds and waterways was within Congress' authority under the commerce clause because the wetlands at issue did not substantially
alfect interstate commerce. 9 Therefore, the Court held in SWANCCthat nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters that do not abut a navigable waterway are
not included in the waters of the United States.' The Supreme Court's ruling
thus eliminated isolated, non-navigable, intrastate water bodies and wetlands

89. Id.
90. Id.
at41216-17.
91. See Morrissey, supra note 87, at 137-38 (describing, as well, the different ways in which
courts have treated thc Migratory Bird Rule).
92.

Compare Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps

of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001), wth United States v. Riverside Bayside Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 134-35, and Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.

Reg. at 41217.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-65.
Id.
at 167-68.
l.
Id.
Debra Alise Spungin, Note, Troubled Waters:Floida"sIsolated Wetlands in the After-

math of SolM Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps o['i Jinccrs,26
NOVA L. REv. 371, 378 (2001).
98.
99.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
Id. at 170-71.
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from the definition of waters of the United States and the jurisdiction of the
CWA.1' Not only did the Court's ruling in SWANCCstrike down the Corps
of Engineers' Migratory Bird Rule, it also affirmed that wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters were still part of the waters of the United States under the
CWA. °' Questions, however, still remained about whether intermittent tributaries qualified as part of CWA waters of the United States. '
H. THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' CONTINUED TO BROADEN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE CWA

After the Corps of Engineers promulgated the Migratory Bird Rule, it further increased the scope of the CWA by including certain other types of water
bodies within its definition of the waters of the United States. 3 In 1996 the
Corps of Engineers modified the general conditions required to obtain a Nationwide" CWA Section 404 Permit ("NWP") in order to protect critical resource waters.' 4 These "critical resource waters" were ephemeral or intermittent streams.'" The 1996 modification required a land developer to obtain a
NWP if it caused a discharge that affected the loss of perennial or intermittent
streams below the ordinary high watermark. ° This added protection for intermittent waters further expanded the reach of the waters of the United States
under the CWA to include virtually any land feature over which drainage water
passed and left a visible mark.' 7 This definition of tributaries, which fell within
the waters of the United States, expanded the CWA's jurisdiction quite
broadly." Because the Court in SWANCCdid not address the issue of whether
tributaries of traditional navigable waters are part of the waters of the United
States under the CWA, the Corps of Engineers continued to assert that they
were part of those waters."° Moreover, lower courts upheld the Corps of Engineers' sweeping assertions of jurisdiction even when tributaries had an intermittent flow or were not even tributaries at all."' With the Supreme Court in
SWANCC limiting the definition of the waters of the United States and the
Corps of Engineers continuing to assert an expansive waters of the United States
definition, the stage was set for another showdown between the Supreme Court
and the Army Corps of Engineers over the scope of the CWA's coverage.'

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
12,818
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Seeid. at 170-72.
5ce Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726-27 (2006).
Sec id.
at 725.
Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,427(March 9, 2000).
Sceid. at 12,888-89, 12,897-98.
See id.at 12889.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e) (2015)).

108. See id.
109. Id. at 726

(citing Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Waters of tie United States" 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1998 Uan. 15, 2013)
(codified in 33 C.F.R. pt. 328)).
110. Id.at 726-27 (citing Treacy v. Newdurn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the tributary in Dcaton
was a roadside ditch).
111. See id; see also SWANCC,531 U.S. at 173.
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I. ILANOS V. UNITED STATES
In RiversidelBayt4ewthe Court held that waters of the United States include
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, yet in SWANCCthe Court held that the
CWA's navigable waters do not extend to isolated ponds used by migratory
birds.'2 The Supreme Court, in Rapimos, once again addressed the issue of
what water bodies and wetlands are protected under the CWA."' Specifically,
the Court in Rapanos considered whether an isolated pond, which was 10 miles
from a waterway and wetlands, which was over a mile from a waterway both
draining into a navigable waterway, are part of the waters of the United States
under the CWA." ' The Court (lid not provide a majority opinion in this case,
but rather only a plurality opinion with several concurring opinions and several
dissenting opinions, consisting of a 4-1-4 split among the justices."' Two of the
opinions, adding tip to live Justices, agreed on the judgment, but did not agree
on reasoning.

1. Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, joined by three other Justices, found that
to include wetlands as adjacent wetlands within the CWA's waters of the United
States, they must have a continuous surface connection to water bodies that are
waters of the United States.' " Justice Scalia's test emerged from the difficulty
discussed in previous cases in distinguishing where land ends and water begins,
and where water ends and wetlands begin. "' A continuous surface connection
would eviscerate this difficulty in distinguishing the demarcations."' Where no
clear line of demarcation between the waters and the wetlands exists, there is a
continuous surface connection. '" Additionally, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
requires that the water body with which the wetland has a continuous surface
connection also have a relatively permanent flow, and be connected to a traditional interstate or intrastate navigable water body.'2 ' Therefore, for a wedand
to be protected under the CWA as an adjacent wetland that is part of the waters
of the United States, it must have (1) a continuous surface connection to (2) a
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate or intrastate navigable waters.'
Justice Scalia further clarified his apparent two-part test for determining if a
wedand is part of the waters of the United States by explaining that the requirement for a water body to have a relatively permanent flow did not necessarily

112.

See Adler, supra note 59, at 2, 6.

113.

Scc id. at l.

114. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729-30 (2006).
115.. Adler, supra note 59, at 10.
116. Id.

117. Rapanos,547 U.S. at. 742.
118. Sc id. at 740 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132
(1985)).
119. Id.at 740-41.
120.

Id. at 740 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132

(1985)).
121.

Id. at 742.

122.

Id.
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exclude waterways or water bodies that dry up under extraordinary circumstances like drought. " Justice Scalia also stated that the court did not mean to
exclude seasonal rivers, which contain a continuous or permanent flow during
some months, but no flow during dry months.'24
In addition to expounding oil his two-part test for determining if a wetland
is an adjacent wetland that is part of the waters of the United States, Justice
Scalia stated that his two-part test would ensure extending CWA jurisdiction to
adjacent wetlands that abutted traditional navigable waters." Justice Scalia
made clear that wetlands which do not abut traditional navigable waters, but
merely have an intermittent, physically remote hydrological connection, do not
fall in the sane category as the wetlands in Riverside Bayview, and therefore
lack the necessary connection needed to be labelled as having a significant nexus
with waters of the United States.'26 Consequently, for Justice Scalia, wetlands
are only adjacent to waters of the United States, and fall under the jurisdiction
of the CWA, if they have a continuous surface connection with a relatively permanent body of water, which is connected to navigable waters.'"
Wetlands that have a continuous surface connection to a relatively permanent body of water during a part of the year satisfy the plurality opinion's test'
Therefore, "relatively permanent" does not exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that
dry up during extraordinary circumstances like a drought. " Nor does it exclude
seasonal rivers that flow during some months, but do not flow during dry
months."
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
While Justice Kennedy concurred with the holding that the cases needed
to be remanded for further consideration of whether the wetlands at issue were
part of the waters of the United States, and thus under the jurisdiction of CWA,
he based his decision on a different line of reasoning.''
Justice Kennedy found that in order for a wetland to be considered part of
the waters of the United States under the CWA as an adjacent wetland, the
wetland must possess a significant nexus to navigable waters. 2 Justice Kennedy
stated that the Corps of Engineers reasonably concluded that such a significant
nexus exists when a wetland is adjacent to a navigable in-fact water body.'" However, if a wetland is adjacent to a non-navigable water body the Corps of Engineers must find on a case-by-case basis whether the wetland has a significant

123. Id. at 732, n.5.
124.

Id. (using the examnple of a 290-day continuously flowing stream).

125. Id.
at 740-41.
126. Id. at 742.
127. See id.
128. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 207 (6th Cir. 2009).

129. Id.at 212 n.5.
130. Id.
131.

Adler, supra note 59, at 11. Rapanos was consolidated with Carabell v. United States

Army Corps' of Eng'rs, 546 U.S. 932 (2005).
132. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

133. See id.
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nexus to other water bodies in order to fall under CWA protection as an adjacent wetland.'" Justice Kennedy stated that when the wetlands, by themselves
or in an amalgamation with similarly situated lands, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of navigable waters they satisfy tie significant nexus requirement " He further clarified that when the wetland's effects
on water quality are uncertain or insubstantial, then there is no significant nexus
with navigable waters.'"
At first glance it may appear that a significant nexus is a less substantial requirement than the continuous surface connection that the plurality opinion
espouses. Yet,Justice Kennedy explained how the continuous surface connection test would find CWAjurisdiction over waters in cases where the significant
nexus test would not.3 7 Justice Kennedy noted that, if continuous, the merest
trickle of water would cause a waterway or wetland to come under the regulation
of the CWA under Justice Scalia's approach, while irregular torrents of water
would not.'" Justice Kennedy further hypothesized a substantial but irregular
flowing waterway would not satisfy the plurality continuous surface connection
test, but would satisfy his significant nexus test.'31 Justice Kennedy argued that
excluding such irregular waterways, as Justice Scalia's test does, was not the intention of Congress because the language of the CWA does not suggest the
exclusion.'"
Justice Kennedy applied his test in two distinct situations to determine if a
wetland is included in the CWA's waters of the United States as an adjacent
wetland.'" First, Justice Kennedy stated that an adjacent wetland is within the
waters of the United States if it is adjacent to a water body that is navigable infact.' Second, he stated that if a wetland is adjacent to a non-navigable tributary
of navigable waters, then a case-by-case evaluation will determine if a significant
nexus exists.'3 Justice Kennedy argues that this limitation is necessary to ensure
that the CWA is not over broadly applied.'"
Thus, the test from Justice Kennedy's concurrence requires that adjacent
wetlands must either be adjacent to a navigable in-fact water body, or the wetland must be adjacent to a non-navigable tributary or other water body, and have
a significant nexus to a navigable waterway.'"
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
The four Justices joining Justice Stevens' dissent concluded that the Court
Id. at 782.
I(.at 780.
Id.
at 769.
Sce id.
Id.at769-70.
139. Id. (stating that the Los Angeles River often looks like a dry roadway and releases such

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

torrents of water, but this river would be excluded by Justice Scalia even though it pasCs the

significant nexus test).
140. Md.at770.
at 780, 782.
141. Sec id.
142. Id.at 780.
143. 1d.at 782.
144. Id.
at 780, 782.
145. Sce id.
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should uphold, under Chevron step two, the Corps of Engineers regulation under the CWA defining "adjacent," and that in this case under that regulation the
wetlands were part of the waters of the United States even though they were at
least eleven miles away from the nearest body of navigable water.'" Justice Stevens based his reasoning upon the concept that wetlands adjacent to tributaries
of traditionally navigable waterways need protection from pollutants like dredge
and fill material to preserve the quality of the nation's waters.'42 Therefore,Justice Stevens reasoned that the Corps of Engineers reasonably interpreted the
CWA in classifying the wetlands at issue as adjacent wetlands within the definition of waters of the United States.'" justice Stevens further explained that in
the Riverside Bayviewcase the Court interpreted the waters of the United States
as being traditionally navigable waters, tributaries of these waters, and wetlands
adjacent to both traditionally navigable waters and their tributaries.' 9 Therefore,
Justice Stevens reasoned that because the wetlands in this case were adjacent to
the tributaries of a traditionally navigable waterway, it was reasonable for the
Corps of Engineers to exercise jurisdiction over them as waters of the United
States.' °
Additionally, in his opinion, justice Stevens explained the nuances of the
meaning of adjacent regarding the position of wetlands to a water body.'' Beginning with the Court's prior interpretation of adjacent wetlands in Riverside
Bayjiew,Justice Stevens contended that the term adjacent does not imply that
there is a continuous surface connection between the wetland and its neighborInstead, he asserted that the term adjacent includes wetlands
ing waterway.'
that either form the border of, or are in reasonable proximity to, other waters
and this is why the Court in Riverside Bayview found the wetlands to be part of
waters of the United States.'" In the present case, justice Stevens argued the
wetlands at issue were adjacent to traditionally navigable waterways because they
abutted tributaries of traditionally navigable waters.' 4 Justice Stevens reasoned
that a wetland abutting a traditionally navigable water body is comparable to a
wetland abutting a tributary because in both cases the wetlands play an important role in the quality and chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
adjacent waters. ' Furthermore,justice Stevens noted that even wetlands physically separated from such waters provide valuable functions such that considering them adjacent waters is appropriate.'" Justice Stevens supported this proposition by citing an example of a wetland separated by a benrin from adjacent
tributaries that still was important to downstream water quality.' 7 Agreeing with
the Corps of Engineers' interpretation of the term adjacent, and disagreeing with
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 720, 788 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Id.at 788.
Id.
Id. at 792.
Id.at 793, 796.
Seeid.at 792-93, 805-06.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.at 806.
Id.
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the other opinions in the case, Justice Stevens contended that wetlands are adjacent to navigable waterways if they play a role either directly affecting or by
influencing a tributary and the downstream physical, chemical, or biological integrity of the navigable waterway.'
J. THE 2008 AND 2011 EPA GUIDANCE MEMORANDUMS
The plurality opinion in Rapanos left the courts wondering which opinion
in the case is controlling.9 In an effort to provide some clarity and to shape
how the courts interpreted the Rapanos decision, in 2008 the EPA and Corps
of Engineers disseminated a guidance document adopting the approach that
lower courts can find CWA jurisdiction under either jusice Scalia's test orJusice Kennedy's test.' 0 Stating that waters are within the CWA's jurisdiction if
they are adjacent to navigable in-fact waters, the guidance defines adjacency elfier as: (1) an unbroken or shallow subsurface connection; (2) separation from
jurisdictional water bodies by berms or manmade barriers; or (3) a relatively
close geographic location supporting an inference of ecological connectedness."' The 2008 guidance further stales that a significant nexus is not required
for wetlands adjacent to relatively permanent non-navigable tributaries.' FollowingJustice Kennedy's concurrence, the guidance compares the aggregate effects of the wetlands at issue with other similarly situated wetlands in the area,
and concludes that it can affect navigable water bodies.'" The guidance itself is
not binding or entitled to any deference, but the regulations it describes are
binding and entitled to deference.' However, a district court found that the
2008 guidance is entitled to deference to the extent that it is persuasive.'5 Thus,
expert factual findings made pursuant to the guidance are entitled to deference
and can only be overturned if they are arbitrary and capricious. l
Unsatisfied with the level of clarity and predictability the 2008 guidance
brought to CWA stakeholders in the permitting process, the EPA and Corps
issued a revised dral't guidance in 2011.6 The 2011 guidance sought to make
Full use of the EPA and Corps' authority under the CWA, thereby increasing
the jurisdiction of waters falling under the CWA.' To accomplish this goal,
the 2011 guidance advised that if eitherJustice Scalia's test orJustice Kennedy's

158. See id.at 796, 805-06 (agreeing wilh fie Corps of Engincers defining adjacent as bordering, contiguous, or neighboring).
159. Damien M. Schiff, losi-Rapanos liIlouit, ABA TRENDs NEwsLETirER, Nov.-Dec. 2009,
at 12.

160. Id,
161. Id. at 13.
162. Id
163. Id.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Id. at 13 (citing Precon Dev. Corp. v. United States Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278,
291 (4th Cir. 2011)).
166. Id; Precon Dev. Corp. v. United States Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278, 296 (4th
Cir. 2011)).
167. Deborah L. Freeman & Steve Dougherty, New Tederi/ Guidanceon Idcntij'ing Waters
Protectedby he Clean WaterAc, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2011, at 65.
168. Id.
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test were satisfied, then the water body at issue would be under CWA jurisdiction."'" The 2011 guidance is broader than the 2008 guidance because it has an
expansive interpretation of the significant nexus test. ' Specifically, the 2011
guidance accepts a wider variety of evidence to demonstrate navigability, and
provides: (1) that the lack of a physical connection to ajurisdictional water body
cannot be used to show absence of a significant nexus; (2) that a hydrologic
connection is not required; and (3) that tie significant nexus test would allow
agencies to consider the water or wetland alone or in combination with other
waters/wetlands in the watershed."' If implemented as proposed, the scope of
CWA authority would increase substantially under the 2011 guidance."' However, the 2011 guidance never achieved the certainty and predictability the EPA
and the Corps of Engineers sought in applying CWA jurisdiction. "' It only
served to provide further quandaries for CWA stakeholders."'
K. THE EPA's PROPOSED AND FINAL RULE FOR WATERS OF THE UNITED

SrATs
On March 25, 2014, the EPA and Corps of Engineers proposed a new rule
that defined which waters fall under the CWA."' Although this rule never fully
went into effect, the EPA stated that the reason for the proposed rule was based
on the need to clarify what streams and wetlands are protected under the
CWA."' Subsequently, the EPA and the Corps of Engineers issued a final rule
that differed from the proposed rule defining the waters of the United States on
May 27, 2015.' In the EPA press release, the agency stated that for the CWA
to effectuate clean drinking water, the waters protected by the CWA needed to
be more "precisely defined and predictably determined.""' The EPA declared
that the rule was grounded in the law and most recent science. 7' In fact, a Corps
of Engineers spokeswoman stated that this rule was generational in impact as it
"completes another chapter in the history of the CWAI,]" and that it will provide "greater clarity, consistency, and predictability" when CWA jurisdiction is
disputed.'" All this occured despite the fact that this rule follows a previous
rule, which was in effect for just over a year.'"'

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
posed
174.

Id.
See id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67.
Id.at 67-68.
See Water Quality Standards Regulatory Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 171, 54,518 (proSept. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
Id.

175. EPA and Army Corps of Enginccrs ClanTy Protection for Nation's Streams and Wetand Exclusions fron Clean Water Act Expanded by Proposal,
lands: Agnculture's Exenptons
ENVrL. PROT. AGENcY (Mar. 25, 2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/3881d73f4d4
aaa0b85257359003f5348/ae90dedd9595a02485257ca600557e30.
176. Id.
177. Clean Water Rule Protects Streams and Wetlands Criicalto Public Health, Communities,and Economy, ENvTI.. PROT. AGENCY (May 27, 2015), hiup://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/adiii
press.nsf/0/62295CDDD6C6B45685257E52004FAC97.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Notice of Availability Regarding the Exemption From Perumitting Under Section

Issue I

A WETlANI) APPROACH 70 R4PANOS

The final rule does not provide that any one of the three opinions authored
in Rapanos decision establish jurisdiction lor the EPA or the Corps of Engineers, and it appears to retract some of the March 2014 proposed rule's guidance because there are changes to that rule in the explanation of the final rle.'2
While the final rule continues to include wetlands adjacent to a body of water
that has been traditionally protected by the CWA, and to define adjacent consistent with previous interpretations of the CWA (bordering, contiguous or
neighboring),"' it increases CWA jurisdiction to include "tributaies."" The
CWA has exercised jurisdiction over tributaries in the past if the tributary contributes a flow of water either directly or indirectly through another body of
water to traditionally navigable waters." In the final rule, tributaries are included if they "provide chemical, physical, or biological functions to downstream waters that meet the significant nexus standard ..... Additionally, the final
rule allows a case-by-case analysis of certain types of wetlands, such as pocosins,
western vernal pools, and prairie potholes, to determine if a significant nexus
exists to a water body covered by the CWA."6
III. THE EDDY CREATED BY RAPANOS AND EPA RULEMAKING
A. THE RAPANOS FALLOUlT
Due to the plurality opinion in the Rapanos case, lower courts have had a
diflicult time deternining which plurality opinion applies."' Specifically, lower
courts have had difficulty determining when a water body or wetland is within
the waters of the United States and therefore subject to the regulation of the
CWA."' Since no opinion carries a majority, lower courts have looked for other
ways to discern which test to use to coiply with Supremc Court precedent."'

404()0(1)(A) of the Clean Water Act to Certain Agricultural Conservation Practiccs, 79 Fed. Reg.
22,276 (Apr. 21, 2014) (explaining that although the EPA and Corps of Engineers were still accepting public comment the interpretive nile was already in ellect).
182. Clean Water Rule: )efinition of "Waters of the United States," 80 Fed. Reg. 37,05437,056 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt 328 & 40 C.F.R. pt. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122,
230, 232, 300, 302, 401); see ENvr. Ptor. AGENCY, supra note 177.
183. Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States;" Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.
37,058 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 & 40 C.F.R. pt. 110, 112, 11 t6, 117,
122, 230, 232, 300, 302,401).
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.5(c)(3) (2015).
187. Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States," 80 Fed. Reg. 37,058
(une 29, 2015) (to be codified at33 C.F.R. pt. 328 & 40 C.F.R. pt. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230,
232, 300, 302, 401).
188. Id. at 37,059 (delining signilicant nexus as "significantly affect the chemical, physical, or
biological integrity of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas").
189. Adler, supra note 59.

190. Id. at 7-8.
191. Id. at 1.
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B. THE DIFFERING APPROACHES OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Lower courts utilize the Marks doctrine to decide controlling law in Supreme Court cases with only plurality and dissenting opinions." The Marks
doctrine states that when a divided court decides a case and no single rationale
enjoys a majority, then the holding of the court is viewed as the position taken
by the Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds.'93 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to apply Marks by seeking to identify the narrowest Rapanos concurrence.'94 The Robison court found that the significant
nexus test was the narrowest because it would not find CWA jurisdiction in
every circumstance that justice Scalia's two-part test would.'9" Furthermore, it
would also not confer blanket authority to the CWA like Justice Stevens' opinion could.'"
Alternatively, some courts apply both the continuous surface connection
test and the significant nexus test from Rapanos without constricting lower
courts to one of these tests exclusively, and therefore can hold that a wetland is
an adjacent wetland protected under the CWA if it satisfies either test.'" The
reasoning behind this approach is that if either test were met, then the dissenting
Justices would concur in judgment with the Justices who authored the plurality
and concurring opinions.' 9 Advocates of this approach suggest that where Justice Kennedy concludes CWA authority does not exist, there will be live votes
against CWA authority."' Furthermore, in some cases where Justice Kennedy
votes against CWA authority, he could be out voted by a margin of eight-to-one
if there was a slight surface connection."° Also, where the significant nexus test
is met but Justice Scalia's continuous surface connection test is not met, there
would be five votes upholding CWA jurisdiction."'
Another reason for applying this approach comes from Justice Stevens in
his Rapanos dissentY Justice Stevens states that all four Justices from the dissent would uphold jurisdiction when eitherjustice Scalia's orJustice Kennedy's
tests are satisfied.93 This allows lower courts to use either test as controlling

192. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
193. Id.
194. Sec United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11 th Cir. 2007); N. California River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke
Excavating Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Precon Dev. Corp. v. United States Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v..lohnson,
467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006).
198. See Precon Dev. Corp., 633 F.3d at 288.
199. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209-10 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining the five votes
as Justice Kennedy plus the four Justices from the plurality opinion) (quoting United States v.
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006)).
200. Id. (explaining that the plurality Justices would count for eight votes plus the dissenting

Justices).
201.

Id. (explaining that the five majoity votes would consist ofiJustice Kennedy plus the dis-

senting).
202. Sec Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 n.14 (2006) (StcvcnsJ., dissenting).
203. Id.
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IV. RIGHTING THE SHIP IN TROUBLED WATERS
The varying approaches to interpreting Rapanos suggest that regulatory and
judicial communities do not have a uniform method for determining which
United States waters are subject to CWAjurisdiction.' This lack of a uniform
methodology for lower courts has persisted since 2006, when he opinion was
issued.' This result has produced a lack of certainty for lower courts applying
Iapanos."' 7 In addition to this lack of certainty and predictability generated, the
lower courts have struggled to apply Marks, as evidenced by the two different
methods in determining which opinion(s) in Rapanos to follow.' Lower courts
need a certain and predictable method that determines which adjacent wetlands
are waters of the United States under CWA jurisdiction.
A. WETlAND FUNCTIONS APPROACH TO THE RAPANOS OPINION

Instead of using Marks, or selecting Justice Scalia's or justice Kennedy's
test, as a means for determining which opinion to apply, there is a better Fact
specific and case-by-case method that generally follows Justice Stevens' approach. ' This Article recommends a wetland functions approach for determining when an adjacent wetland is part of the waters of the United States. This
approach utilizes either justice Scalia's or Justice Kennedy's test depending on
the type of ecosystem service, or wetland function, that the wetland at issue provides. The method involves a three-step analysis.
The three-step framework first requires a detemination of the wetland's
predominant function. EPA listed wetland finctions are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Groundwater Recharge
Flood and erosion protection
Pollution reduction
Wildlife habitat
2
Economic importance
1

The second step applies either the continuous surface connection test, the
significant nexus test, and/or Justice Stevens' dissent. Below is a proposed list
204. See id.
205. SeeJennifer L. Bolger & Edward B. Witte, Post Rapanos: 7he Regulatory Miasma Engulling Isolated Wedands andthe Clean Water Act, A.B.A AcRic. MGMT. COMM. NEWSL. Aug.

2009 at 8, 10.
206.

See W. Blaine Early III, Court Pinds a "Silnficant Nexus" in Virginia Wetlnd Case,

A.B.A AcRIC. McMT. COMM. Nrtwsi. Dec. 2013, at 8, 10.
207. See id.
208. CornpareUnited States v.Johnson, 467 F.3d 56,61 (1st Cir. 2006), uitl United States v.
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11 di Cir. 2007) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977)); See Early III, supranote 206, at 10.

209. Sce Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 n. 14 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159J 32HTS 2006 WL 2221629, at * 19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2,
2006).
210.

Wetlands: An Introduction,ENVrL. PiRO'r. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/wedands

basic.cfin#importance (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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of each wetland function's corresponding Rapanos test:
Wedand Function
Ground water recharge
Flood and erosion protection

Rapanos Test
Continuous surface connection test
Continuous surface connection test
or the significant nexus test

Pollution reduction
Wildlife habitat

Significant nexus test "
Significant nexus test or the Corps of
Engineers' definition of "adjacent"
under
(as a reasonable interpretation
2
the Stevens' dissen)

Economic importance

Corps of Engineers' reasonable interpretation" '

The last step in this franework is to analyze if the wetland at issue satisfies
the test set forth in the corresponding Japanosopinion. How well the wetland
in question achieves a particular wetland function determines if the Rapanos
test is satisfied.
The subsections below explore each wetland function and determine which
Rapanostest should be applied when a particular wetland function is prevalent.
Lastly, for each particular wetland function, there is a discussion of a lower court
decision where a court has made a determination regarding whether an adjacent
wetland is within the waters of the United States. These discussions indicate
how courts make decisions as to whether a particular wetland is within CWA
jurisdiction on a basis that is similar to the recommended wetland functions
methodology.
B. GROUNDWATER RECHARGE
The groundwater recharge function allows wetlands to replenish the supply
of groundwater through infiltration and percolation of water above ground
down into the saturated zone."' Wetlands act as a permeable layer between the
surface and large storages or groundwater in aquifers." ' Thus, a wetland can act
as a natural sponge soaking up flood or surface water and transferring it into
groundwater.' In fact, tie storage capacity of wetlands is so enormous that it is
estimated that wetlands in South Carolina store 45.8 billion gallons of water." '
211. Rapanos,547 U.S. at 742; see ifra Part IV.B.
212. Rapanos, 547 at 780 (Kcnncdy,J., concurring); see infra Part IV.C.
213.

Rapanos,547 at 780; see infra Part IV.D.

214. Rapanos,547 at 780, 806 (KennedyJ., concurring) (Stevens,J., dissenting); see infra Part

IV.E.
215. Rapanos, 547 at 806 (Stevens,J., (issenting); sec infra Part IV.F.
216. U.S. CONG., OFICE OF TECH. ASsESSMF,,,r, OTA-O-206, WETLANDS- 7IEIR USEAND
REGuIATION 47 (1984).
217. See id. at 48.
218. Id.; MARK S. DENNISON, MITIGATION BANKING AND OTHER SmTATEGIES FOR
DEVELOPMENTANI) COMPLIANCE, WI.rI
7 NI)S MrrIGIvrON, at 3 (1997).
219. ENVrIL. Por. AGENCY, supainote 210.

Issue I

A WETLANI) APPROACH TO IAJANOS

Once water saturates a wetland, it is released slowly, contributing to the base
flow of surface waters during dry periods. This slow release of water could be
characterized as a continuous, relatively permanent flow of water. Justice
Scalia's test should apply when deciding whether a wetland should be classified
as adjacent within CWA waters of the United States, and when the predominate
function perlonned by that wetland is groundwater recharge. This is because
Justice Scalia's test consists of two parts that also embody characteristics of
groundwater recharge."' Specifically, the slow release of water over a long period of time from a wetland can be viewed as a continuous surlace connection
to a nearby water body, which has a relatively permanent flow.'
Justice Scalia could have been describing a waterway fed by a wetland releasing stored groundwater under the continuous surface connection prong oF
his test because groundwater recharge is characterized by continuous flow.
Moreover, groundwater recharge's continuous release is slow, so adjacent waters to the wetland could be dry for a portion of the year. 4 A continuous release
of water that merely dampened the ground between a navigable waterway and
wetlands would fit the continuous surface connection test application.' Even
without a topical flow of water, the continuous surface test is satisfied if the waterway is dry because of an extraordinary condition like drought or if the waterway is routinely dry during certain parts of the year. " Additionally, Justice
Scalia's test should be applied when a wetland's primary function is groundwater
recharge due to the groundwater recharge's possible non-permanent nature of
the hydrological connection, there would be a "boundary-drawing problem" between where the water body ends and where land and the wedands begin.' It
is analogous to a seasonal river, which contains water for 290 days a year but
experiences dry periods, which Justice Scalia suggested could still be characterized as having a relatively permanent flow.' " Furthermore, since groundwater
recharge occurs slowly over a long period of time, connections between wetlands and navigable waters can be more than intermittent and physically remote,
but may not appear as more than irregular." Achieving more than an intermittent and physically remote connection with traditionally navigable waters is a
hallmark of satisfying Justice Scalia's test. Moreover, a wetland's constant recharge means that nearby waters could receive substantial enough additional
water to meet the definition of a traditional navigable waterway."' When a wetland is physically touching a navigable waterway, it abuts it, and Justice Scalia
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considers a wetland abutting a navigable waterway to be part of the waters of the
United States. " For these reasons, the groundwater recharge function of a wetland satisfies Justice Scalia's test by demonstrating a continuous surface connection to a water body with a relatively permanent flow.'
In Cundil; the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied justice Scalia's test
to decide whether wetlands were sufficiently connected to a navigable river
through its tributaries.' The Corps of Engineers sought to prevent a landowner
and his son from discharging dredge or fill material into wetlands on their property. " The government contended that these wetlands were within the waters
of the United States because of their connection through tributaries of the
Green River, which eventually flows into the Ohio River.' The most prevalent
wetland function ascertainable in this case is groundwater recharge. "7 This is
apparent through the court's focus on a release of orange or red tinted water
that flowed continuously from wetlands to the Green River through its tributary,
Caney Creek.' The Sixth Circuit applied Justice Scalia's continuous surface
connection test to determine if the wetlands were waters of the United States.0'
The court accepted the district court's finding that a continuous surface connection existed, stating that, as previously noted, when dampness exists in the soil
connecting a wetland and a navigable in-fact waterway or its tributaries there is
a connection. " This continuous dampness is analogous to the slow release of
ground water, which is a hallmark of the groundwater recharge function. Furthermore, the court found that continuously saturated soil satisfied the continuous surface connection prong of justice Scalia's test."' Ultimately, the court
found that the wetlands were waters of the United States based on the continuous surface connection with a relatively permanent water body leading to navigable waters. ' The court could also have found the necessary surface connection and relative permanence of this connection through the examination of the
continuous release of water that accompanies groundwater recharge. " Therefore, a wedand function approach would lead to the same result as courts applyingJustice Scalia's test.
C. FLOOD AND ERosION PROTECTION

Another wetland function, which is similar to groundwater recharge and
focuses on wetlands facilitating the slow release of stored water, is the flood and
erosion protection function." This function appears when a wetland acts to
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trap excess rain, storm, or floodwater." Additionally, erosion protection occurs
when wetland plants keeps soil in place despite excess water." A wetland
providing this Function traps excess water as a matter of topography, which results from wetlands in low-lying areas naturally collecting excess water.4 ' Additionally, soil in an unsaturated wedland can provide excess capacity for storing
floodwaters." Overall, a wetland can function like a natural sponge, storing
excess water and slowly releasing it. " Also, trees, roots, and vegetation in a
wetland can slow the flow of floodwaters and distribute this water more evenly
over the flood plain, reducing the overall height of floodwaters.' Wetlands
reduce soil erosion by slowing excess water.' Furthermore, wetland vegetation
reduces erosion by holding soil in place." The flood and erosion protection
function is best characterized by the trapping and slow release of surface water.'
The braking action or slowing of excess water that is characteristic of flood
and erosion protection elicits Justice Scalia's test."5 This is because by slowing
and retaining floodwaters, wetlands may release water more evenly, and thus
continuously or pernanendy.5 Further, the continuous and permanent nature
of water flow between a wetland and a navigable body of water can be seen as
meeting the requirements of the Justice Scalia's test.' While this wetland function could cause a permanent flow of water, it will more likely result in a continuous flow after a flood or other heavy precipitation event. Boundary drawing
issues may occur when demarcation between bodies of water and wetlands becomes diflicult in the latter scenario, thereby necessitating implementation of
Justice Scalia's test." Furthermore, when a wetland soaks up additional water
from floods, it acts like a natural reservoir." That reservoir then releases water
at a lesser rate than it absorbs, increasing the likelihood that a continuous surface connection exists and that adjacent waterways will have a relatively permanent flow." Both the wetland's slowing and absorption of high water quantities,
along with retaining soil through wetland vegetation, meet the elements the plurality's test."" In fact, the absence of a surface connection does not undermine
satisfying Justice Scalia's test based on its application to seasonal rivers where a

visible surlace connection was similarly not present.'
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However, if flood and erosion protection is the predominant factor in the
wetlands at issue, Justice Scalia's test is not the only test that should be applied.
If the nature of the function is such that the wetlands prevent erosion through
vegetation holding river and stream banks in place, then the test in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rapamos should also apply."' This is because holding
soil in place along a waterway's edge demonstrates that wetlands, "either alone,
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as 'navigable.'"" Through erosion protection, a wetland
significantly affects the physical and chemical integrity of nearby water bodies
because it maintains river or strean banks at the same position and keeps excess
sediment from entering the water bodies.2" Furthermore, when the nature of
the wetland function is absorption and floodwater storage (flood and erosion
protection), Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test should apply. This is true
because the slow release of excess water will increase volune in the adjacent
waterway, increasing the likelihood that tie wetland is adjacent to navigable infact waters.' Moreover, even if the increase in water due to the slow floodwater
release from a wetland does not render an adjacent waterway navigable, the wetland can still provide a significant nexus to the adjacent water body.' According
to Justice Kennedy, a significant nexus is demonstrated by showing the wetland's
chemical or physical effect on other non-navigable waters," Of course, under
Justice Kennedy's approach, in such a situation the effect of the wetlands on
non-navigable waters is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and not as a matter of
law. ' Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test should apply if evidence of a
wetland's predominant function most visibly points to flood and erosion protection.' The particular wetland at issue can still have a significant nexus under
a case-by-case determination if it is affects waters considered navigable, and
there is a significant connection to navigable waters through the increased volume of water, or if the wetland is not adjacent to a navigable water-way."
One case that seemingly applied both tests involved filling wetlands separated from a ditch linked to the Northwest River, a navigable waterway, by a
berm.' The court observed that while it could take the approach of applying
the test from either Justice Scalia's orJustice Kennedy's opinion in Rapanos,it
ultimately determined that the significant nexus test from Justice Kennedy's
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opinion was more applicable in this situation. 7 In this case, the Corps of Engineers showed that the wetlands stored 93,750 cubic feet of water, slowed water
velocities by 1.13 foot per second, and trapped sediment and organic material,
which would otherwise enter the waterway." This evinces a striking focus upon
the flood and erosion protection characteristics of excess water slowing and storage, and retaining of soil through the roots of vegetation." The court, in applying the significant nexus test, wrestled with whether the wetlands adequately
slowed the velocity of water heading down stream in order to effectuate a significant effect on the chemical and physical integrity of the waters." 5 Ultimately,
the court concluded that there was not enough evidence to show that the water
was significantly slowed in order to prevent soil erosion or that the wetland's
potential storage capacity was similar to the water actually held by the wetland.
Thus, the Court acknowledged that wetland function was present but that there7
was not enough evidence of that function to satisfy the significant nexus test.
This case valuably demonstrates how applying a wetland functions approach
can result in the court applying the correct Rapimos test even though the existence of the wetland function and the application of that corresponding test do
not lead to a finding of CWA jurisdiction over the wetlands at issue here. "
D. POLLUTION REDUCTION
The groundwater recharge and pollution reduction functions are similar to
the flood and erosion protection wetland function." The main characteristic of
a wedand's pollution reduction function is filtering out pollution that would otherwise end up in a waterway." The flood and erosion protection function is
similar in that it keeps excess soil and sediment out of the nearby waterway." '
Wetlands reduce pollution in a number of ways. " ' First, wetlands trap suspended solids, which are solid particles contained in water, by decreasing the
velocity of water flow and thereby decreasing the kinetic energy that these particles have, causing them to settle on the waterbed. 3 Excessive anounts ofthese
suspended particles can interfere with the growth of aquatic vegetation by blocking out needed sunlight and can smother bottom dwelling invertebrates, as well
as inhibit fish spawning. ' Additionally, the wetland lilters out toxic substances
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from water because the toxic substances can attach to suspended solids and setde.' Another way that wetlands reduce pollution in waterways is through trapping excessive amounts of nitrogen and phosphorous.' These chemicals are
necessary for the growth of algae and cause algae blooms when they grow in
excess, which leads to eventual decomposition, in turn reducing the level of
oxygen in the water, and making it harder for other organisms, such as fish, to
survive. 7 Wetlands contribute significantly to connected waterways' health
when performing these utilities.'
The wetland pollution reduction function is best encapsulated by Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Japanos." The fact that wetlands can have an effect
or impact on adjacent and downstream waters through removing pollution is
reminiscent of the part of justice Kennedy's opinion rereming to wetlands as
"similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affectlingl the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters. . ."o In other words,
the pollution reduction function of a wetland would have a significant effect on
adjacent waters' chemical and biological integrity, demonstrating a significant
nexus." In performing the pollution reduction function, a wetland acts like a
wastewater facility, removing suspended solids, toxic substances, and other
chemicals that are not harmonious with the aquatic environment. " This process of removing harmful pollutants significantly affects the chemical and biological composition of nearby water bodies. " Thus, Justice Kennedy would
find that a significant nexus existed if a wetland removes pollutants or excess
sediment from the water, and therefore positively impacts the adjacent waters
by fostering a better habitat for fish and amnphibians. 4
In one rather salient example of a court focusing upon the pollution reduction function, a court applied Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in determining whether wastewater discharged into a basalt pond, which included wetlands separated from a navigable in-fact waterway by a levee, was a discharge
into waters of the United States."' In N. Cal.Jiver Watch v. City ofHealdsbug,
the court elected to apply Justice Kennedy's test to determine if there was a
significant nexus between the basalt pond wetlands and the Russian River, a
navigable waterway.' In applying the significant nexus test, the court found a
demonstrated link between the chemical integrity of the pond and the Russian
River, which satisfied the test. "7 Specifically, the court found that while the wetlands were able to remove some chlorides from the sewage discharge into the

285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.at 49.
Id.
See id.
Id.at 48.

289. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (Kennedy,J., concurring).

290. Id.
291. Id.; see ENVTL. PROT. ACrENrCY, supra note 208.
292. See Water Quality andHydrology, ENVrL.PROv. AcF.Ncy, hup:/lwater.epa.gov/type/wet
lands/wqhydrology.cfin (last updated March 6, 2012).
293. See Rapanos,547 U.S. at 780.
294. See Id.; ENvrL. PROT.AGENCY, supra note 292.
295. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2007).
296. See id. at 999-1000.
297. Id.at 1001.

Issue I

A WEL7AND APPROACH TO RAPANOS

pond, they could not remove all of them and the Russian river contained higher
chloride levels than it would otherwise have; therefore, there must be a chemical
connection between the pond and the river. " Thus, the Rapanos Court would
have found that the wetlands reduced pollution, the significant nexus test was
applicable, and the test was satisfied if it had used a wetlands function approach
in the facts of this case.' If the Court followed the approach advocated by this
paper, the court would have applied the same test as it did in the actual case.
E. WILrIIFE HABITAT
The most difficult wedand function to apply may be the wildlife habitat wetland function.' This is because it appears that a finding of jurisdiction under
the CWA with reference solely to bird or animal habitat seems contrary to the
decision in SWANCC, where the court struck down the migratory bird rule."
However, the wildlife habitat function is based on more than just a finding that
the wetland in question is habitat to migratory birds.a The function is characterized by the fact that many species of plants and animals are only found in
wetlands."' Some animals that are not found exclusively in wetlands are either
born only in wetlands or spend a portion of their maturation in wetlands."° Additionally, certain migratory birds are completely dependent on wetlands and
Therelore, the wildlife habitat function is
would go extinct without thn.
demonstrated by a wetland containing unique plants and animals that are known
to congregate in both the wetland and waterway at issue.
Biological or wildlife connections have been found between wetlands and
navigable water bodies where both share the samne species of wildlife."° The
common animal, plant, bird, and fish species that exist in a wetland, as well as
the adjacent navigable waterway, make both water features indistinguishable."
This provides a significant nexus between the wetlands and the adjacent waterway. " The significant nexus is satislied in this situation because the wetlands
alone, or in conjunction with other like lands in the area, significantly affect the
biological integrity of navigable waters covered under the CWA.' Therefore,
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the significant nexus test from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rapanos is the
most appropriate test to apply where a particular wetland's predominant wetland function is wildlife habitat."' To achieve the significant nexus that is required by Justice Kennedy's test, however, a particular wetland's wildlife habitat
must consist of more than habitat for migratory birds.3 ' A significant nexus was
not found in SWANCCbetween isolated ponds and navigable waterways, because the only biological connection was that the ponds served as habitat for
migratory birds. ' In order to demonstrate a sufficient connection to meet the
significant nexus test through a biological relationship, the wetlands must be
indistinguishable from the adjacent navigable waterway such that the two water
features cannot be separated ecologically." ' Therefore, in comparison with the
other wetland functions applying the significant nexus test, the connection required under the wildlife habitat function must rise to a more substantial level
in order to satisfy the test."
Courts could apply Justice Stevens' Rapanosdissent when the predominant
wetland function is wildlife habitat.3 ' Justice Stevens remarked in his Rapanos
dissent that while physically separated wetlands may perform less valuable functions than wetlands that abut a navigable water body, the wetlands might still
provide important downstream water quality benefits. ' He wrote that the determination of whether there was enough of a connection to warrant CWA jurisdiction should be leflt to the Corps of Engineers.3 ' Thus, if the biological
connection is sufficient, like in N. Cal. River Watch, yet is the only connection
between the wetlands and the adjacent waterway, then a finding of CWA jurisdiction would still be appropriate under the command of Rapanos"'
The previously discussed Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals N. Cal River
Watch decision addressed the issue of whether the wildlife function demonstrated that wetlands separated by a levee from a navigable waterway were within
the waters of the United States under the CWA.3 ' The court found that a biological connection to fish and bird species was the same in the wetlands and in
the nearby navigable river 3 While this was one of three connections the court
noted in determining that a significant nexus existed, which placed the wetlands
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under CWA jurisdiction, presumably the court would still have exercised jurisdiction based on a biological connection alone, because this biological connection may have still proved important enough to the downstream water quality of
the adjacent water body.' Though the court found CWA jurisdiction over the
wetlands at issue using a significant nexus analysis, it is conceivable that the court
would have come to the same result in this case if it had applied a wildlife habitat
function approach alone to decide the controversy.
F. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

The economic function of wedands is not intuitively apparent or as tangible
as the other functions, but it is just as valuable. Wetlands play an important role
in the economy by providing a vast number of commercial, animal, and recreational products." For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates that 40 million anglers spend about $45 billion dollars
every year on e(luipment, licenses, and other items in pursuing fishing activiies " ' In the commercial sector, the salmon industry was valued at $555 million
in 2010."' The economic connection to wetlands cannot be understated in this
industry, as salmbn depend on small streams that do not flow all year round
and that can be lound as far as 900 miles inland from the ocean." Outside of
fishing, 2.3 million hunters spend $1.3 billion dollars pursuing migratory birds
that depend on healthy wetlands to migrate. 2 Even farmers depend on the
fresh water supplied by wetlands to irrigate their crops."' Wetlands also contribute a myriad of products, medicines, recreational activities, and raw materials to the economy.
In cases where the economic function of wetlands is most prevalent,Justice
Stevens' dissent should be applied. This is because a wetland that has none of
the previously discussed wetland functions will likely not have an adjacent, configuous, or abutting connection to a navigable waterway. ' While a wetland that
is connected to a navigable waterway can have a significant impact on the water
(qualityof a nearby water body and its ecosystem, those wetlands that are not so
connected can still come under CWA jurisdiction and be protected from development or other uses.' Thus, where wetlands serve an important economic
purpose or provide substantial economic benefits, Justice Stevens' deference to
the Corps of Engineers and EPA's detennination is warranted."' For instance,
wetlands not connected to a navigable river can still produce a wide variety of
animals, plants, fish, and birds whose presence impacts the economy." While
'
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this impact may be less valuable than other functions brought about by a direct
connection to a navigable water body, it still could be enough of a connection
to warrant CWA protection by making the wetland an adjacent wetland within
the waters of the United States.
While no court would use Justice Stevens' dissent as the holding to be applied from Rapanos, there are courts that have used the reasoning from the
dissent to find a basis to uphold CWA jurisdiction.' In Benjauin v. Douglas
Ridge Rifle Club, earthen berms surrounding a shooting range separated the
range from wetlands and an intennittent creek, which connected with the Clackamas River over four miles away.' Dirt from the berns was deposited into the
creek, giving rise to a CWA violation for placing dredged or fill material into,
arguably, a CWA protected wetland.' One of the issues before the court was
whether the wetlands were under CWA jurisdiction; specifically, whether they
were adjacent to waters of the United States.' While the court found a hydrological connection between the creek and the Clackamas River, a navigable waterway, the court also found another connection based on the creek and the
wetlands function of serving as a spawning ground for salmon.' While the
court could have rested its holding solely on an ecological connection, implying
that the wildlife habitat function was present, it did specifically mention the value
of having salmon in the creek. " Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the
economic function of the wetlands could have provided the basis for the court's
finding that the wetlands were part of the waters of the United States due to the
dependence of salmon on the wetlands at issue in this case. '
While it can be theorized that the court found CWA jurisdiction based on
the economic impact of a particular wetland, it is of note that the court in Benjamin also found that the creek met the significant nexus test from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rapanos.' Hence, it is clear that when applying the
economic function, based upon Justice Stevens' Rapanos dissent, in order to
find a connection with navigable waters, it cannot be the only basis for the connection."2 It is evident from this point that applying an economic importance
wetland function approach in conjunction with another wetland function, leads
to a finding within the waters of the United States.'

G. TYPE OF EVIDENCE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A WETLANI)'S
PREDOMINANT FUNCTION

In applying the wetland functions approach, what type of evidence is re-
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quired to demonstrate the existence of a wetland function in a particular wetland? The courts have grappled with a similar question in determining what
type of evidence should be considered to show that a significant nexus exists"
The lower federal courts have held that both qualitative and quantitative evidence can be used to demonstrate that a significant nexus exists." In Cundit,
the government used expert testimony to establish a significant nexus between
the wetlands at issue and a nearby navigable waterway by showing that the wetlands performed significant ecological functions, which impacted the aquatic
environment of the river."' Thereby, the court used expert testimony, or qualitative evidence, to establish the existence of a significant nexus or a wetland
function."' Additionally, the court in N. Cal. River Watch allowed the Corps
of Engineers to present quantifiable data to demonstrate a significant nexus between wetlands and a nearby navigable waterway." Specifically, the Corps of
Engineers demonstrated that twenty-six percent of the water from the basalt
pond drained into the Russian River. " Thus, the Corps of Engineers established a hydrological connection and a significant nexus between the pond and
the Russian River." ° This decision allows the use of quantitative data to demonstrate a significant nexus or wetland function.' Therefore, these examples show
that either qualitative (expert testimony), quantitative (data/scientific report), or
both types of evidence can be used to satisfy one of the tests from the Rapanos
opinions, or to establish the existence of a wetland function."
H. WETLAND FIUNCTION ANALYSIS AND THE EPA'S FINAL RULE

Although this paper's previous discussion indicates how a wetland function
analysis relates to the plurality opinion in Rapanos,one must consider whether
the EPA's final rule that defines the waters of the United Slates would Forestall
this analysis. The answer to this question is: not necessarily. While the EPA's
final rule focuses on determining if an adjacent wetland falls under the protection of the CWA as being part of the waters of the United States, it uses reasoning from all three principal opinions in Rapanosfor support."
One of the most significant changes the final rule makes is increasing CWA
jurisdiction to tributaries that contribute flow to traditionally navigable waters if
they provide chemical, physical, or biological functions to downstream waters
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349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See id.
352. See Precon Dev. Corp., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278, 294
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that meet the significant nexus standard."4 The final rule continues to use Justice Kennedy's test detenrmining if tributaries are covered under the CWA,
providing room for using wetland functions as evidence of a water body providing a chemical, physical, or biological function to downstream waters. Chemical
functions can be an indication of groundwater recharge or pollution reduction,
anong other things."
In fact the final rule states that the covered tributaries are those that play an
important role in transporting not only water, but also sediments, organic matter, and organisms.' This further illustrates the applicability of the other wetland functions, like flood and erosion protection, wildlife habitat, and economic
importance, as showcasing a water body's inclusion under the CWA. "7
Does the court's reliance on Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test, now
codified in the final rule, and underlying reasoning mean that this is the only
test that should be relied on when applying Rapanosto future cases determining
CWA jurisdiction? " Not exactly. The significant nexus language in the final
rule, along with the rule's unchanged definition of "adjacent," undoubtedly
makes clear that adjacent waters are not required to abut navigable waters in
order to be a part of the waters of the United States." The final rule still encompasses Justice Scalia's continuous surface connection with a relatively permanent water body." ° The rule provides definitions for the terms intermittent
and perennial flow waterways." This is an effort to provide clarity for stakeholders in order to determine whether there is a continuous surface connection
like the one stated injustice Scalia's opinion. " Therefore, the result of the final
rule uses Justice Scalia's test; although, it does state that water flow alone is not
determinative of the impact and character on traditional navigable waters.'
Furthermore, the final rule goes so far as to incorporate some of Justice
Stevens' dissent.' The EPA acknowledges in the final rule that even if a wetland or water body is only marginally connected hydrologically through a subsurface connection, the proximity of the wedand to the adjacent water body is
taken into account in making a determination of whether the wetland is a protected adjacent wedand.' Thus, if an isolated wetland has a questionable connection to a navigable waterway, the Corps of Engineers could make a determination that the wedand is adjacent to the waterway if its proximity falls within
the scope of the final rule.' This draws on the reasoning of Justice Stevens in
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his Rapanos dissent that wetlands do not need to be contiguous or bordering in
order to be adjacent." Justice Stevens stated that the inquiry of whether wetlands are adjacent encompasses an analysis of reasonable proximity to navigable
waters.' Thus, a wetland can be adjacent to a nearby navigable water body even
if it seems that there is neither a direct hydrological connection nor a significant
nexus to the navigable waterway, such as when there is a space between them
comprised of soil."s Even in this situation, where there is a lack of such connections, Justice Stevens nevertheless found reasonable proximity that was sufficient for a wetland to be classified as adjacent, and thus protected by the
CWA" This demonstrates thatJustice Stevens' dissent in Rapanoscan be applied in making a determination that wetlands are adjacent to a navigable water
body."'
The final rule adopts parts of each Rapalnosopinion to a degree."' Therefore, using a wetlands function analysis to make future determinations regarding
whether a particular wetland is within CWAjurisdiction complies with the final
rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the judgment and opinions in the Rapanos case were issued nine
years ago, there still seems no uniform consensus on how to apply the opinions
in determining whether a particular wetland is protected under the CWA as
part ofthe waters of the United States."' The fact that the Rapimos opinions do
not espouse three different degrees of magnitude of connection between adjacent wetlands and waters of the United States makes application of the differing
tests difficult." Adding to this problem is the lack of consensus among the
courts as to how to apply the Marks doctrine to Rapanos, complicating how to
interpret the holding(s) of RapanosY Instead of tie optional, and somewhat
arbitrary methods of choosing an opinion based on Marks, or Justice Stevens'
remarks from his dissent in Rapanos, courts need a more concrete and predictable method of determining which opinion (s) to apply.7
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This Article recommends that courts adopt a wetland functions approach
when applying the Rapanos case in making a determination of whether a particular wetland is protected under the CWA as an adjacent wetland that is part
of waters of the United States. This type of analysis better ensures that there is
some relationship between the wetland and nearby water bodies, which should
be the principal issue in determining if a particular wetland lalls within the waters of the United States as adjacent."' Additionally, the tests in the Rapanos
opinions, which are used to make the determination of whether a wetland function exists, are also contained within the EPA's final rule on waters of the United
States. " Because the tests from the various opinions in Rapanos are adopted
in the final rule, and this rule is designed to clarify the holding of Rapanos by
providing greater clarity for CWA stakeholders, this paper's proposed wetlands
functions analysis approach provides clarity mad predictability. 9 Furthermore,
a wetlands function approach will not force the courts to depart from the present method of applying Rapanos to determine which wetlands are protected
under the CWA as adjacent.' The demand for clarity, along with the certainty
that the proposed wetland functions approach offers, demonstrates that this
proposed wetlands function approach offers a better alternative than strictly applying Marks to Rapanosor following the approach suggested byJustice Stevens
in his Rapanosdissent, and is consistent with the EPA and Corps' interpretation
of the CWA. ' Consequently, this Article's proposed wedand functions approach should be used when making a determination of whether wetlands are
waters of the United States and under CWA jurisdiction.
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